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PEOPLE V. CAVANAUGH

[erim. No. 5624.

In Bank.

[44 C.2d

Apr. 12, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MICHAEL TIMOTHY
CAVANAUGH, Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Instructions-Venue.-It is proper to instruct
jury that territorial jurisdiction can be established by preponderance of evidence.
[2] Id.-Evidence-Venue.-Territorial jurisdiction can be shown
by circumstantial evidence.
.
[3] Homicide - Evidence - Place of Crime.-Implied finding of
jury that murder took place in San Diego County and not in
Tijuana where, according to defendant, fatal stabbing occurred after he had driven victim there in his car, is sustained
by evidence indicating that defendant would not have had
time to make trip to Tijuana and to have moved victim's body,
naked and bleeding as he claims, from back seat of car to
the trunk without leaving traces of blood which would have
been observed by border guards; by testimony of defendant's
wife that she saw no blood in back seat when she looked there
shortly after defendant's return; and by fact that defendant
himself was not then bloodstained or disheveled.
[4] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Place of Crime.-Statement by prosecuting attorney in murder case that he did not
know location of place of crime was not admission of failure
of proof of venue where such statement was properly made
in course of argument that place of killing could be inferred.
[5] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-A defendant cannot be required to defend himself against charge of any crime other
than that for which he is on trial, but evidence which is
relevant in establishing guilt of crime charged is admissible
notwithstanding fact that it tends to connect defendant with
offense not included in charge.
[6] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Relevancy of evidence that
proves crimes other than that charged must be examined with
care, due to prejudicial nature of such evidence, and it should

[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 135 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 309 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 750; [2] Criminal
Law, § 568; [3] Homicide, § 152; [4] Criminal Law, § 617; [5, 6]
Criminal Law, § 393(2); [7] Homicide, § 264; [8] Homicide, § 102;
[9] Criminal Law, §§ 393(5), 393(9); [10] Homicide, § U5(5);
[11] Criminal Law, § 443; [12] Witnesses, § 269; [13] Criminal
Law, § 533; [14] Homicide, § 262; [15] Criminal Law, § 629.
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not be admitted simply on showing that some part of that
transaction is relevant to case.
[7] Homicide-Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Other Offenses.-Though evidence of defendant's escape from state
mental hospital and of his nonviolent crimes does not sufficiently tend to show motive for or have enough relevanee
toward proving violent robberies and commission of murder
to have been properly admitted in murder case, admission of
such evidence did not prejudice defendant or result in miscarriage of justice (Const., art. VI, § 4Y2) , where consideration
of comparatively minor offenses against property could hardly
have influenced jury one way or other in their appraisal of
evidence as to crime against life.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Evidence of defendant's conduct in connection with subsequent offenses of battery and
robbery is relevant and admissible in murder case where such
evidence tends to show striking similarity in significant respects to his conduct in connection with murder charged in
that in each case defendant viciously attacked and robbed
victim with whom he had become acquainted when they drank
together in a bar; in each case defendant told story of his
drinking companion being in car with girl or girls whom he
and defendant had "picked up" and of defendant returning
to car to find victim bloody and beaten; and in each instance
defendant was thereafter in possession of property of victim.
[9] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes.-While it is often
said that evidence of similar crimes is relevant to show plan,
scheme, system or design, this is not to be understood as meaning that such evidence is admissible only if it tends to show
premeditated, calculated design, it also is relevant and may
be admissible where it tends to show that defendant was guilty
of crime charged by showing peculiar or characteristic behavior pattern of defendant which is manifest in conduct of
transgressor in both crimes.
[10] Homicide-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.A conviction of first degree murder is sustained by evidence indicating that defendant murdered victim in perpetration of
robbery, as shown by his subsequent possession of victim's
property and his posing as victim.
[11] Criminal Law-Evidence-Declarations and Admissions of Defendant.-Although extrajudicial statements of defendant are
evidence which tends to prove truth of matter stated, they
eonstitute admissions and are not vulnerable to hearsay objection.
[12] Witnesses - Impeachment - Inconsistent Statements.-Evidence of defendant's self-contradictions is admissible to im.
peach him as a witness.
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[13] Criminal Law-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence.-Except
in rare cases, dClIlon:,;trative evidence that tends to prove material issue or clarify circumstances of crime is admissible
despite its prejudicial tendency.
[14] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Though no
useful and proper purpose was served in murder case by
emphasizing to jury, by repeated testimonial and photographic
description, horrible condition in which victim's body was
because of its having been left on desert, or by introducing in
evidence fingers of deceased, and use of such evidence was
improper and erroneous, such error did not require reversal of
judgment where, in view of evidence lawfully adduced, no
miscarriage of justice resulted. (Const., art. VI, § 4%.)
[15] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Defendant.-District attorney's argument in murder case that defendant's nonviolent crimes against property tended to show
that defendant was sort of person who would viciously beat
a person in order to rob him was not improper appeal to passion j rather it was improper reasoning, since resort to it might
tend to weaken rather than strengthen case of prosecution,
and however it be viewed it did not result in miscarriage of
justice.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County
and from an order denying a new trial or modification of
the judgment. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
death penalty, affirmed.
Richard E. Adams, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James
and Jay L. Shavelson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant was charged by information
with the murder of Ralph R. Welch, on or about July 23,
1953, and with two prior convictions of felony (issuing a
check with intent to defraud and issuing a check with no
account). He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason
of insanity. A jury fonnel rlefendant guilty of murder of
[13] See CalJur.2d, Evidence, § 204 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
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the first degree and made no recommendation as to penalty;1
the jury further found that defendant was sane at the time
of the commission of the offense charged. No disposition
was made of the allegations of prior convictions of felony
and none appears to be necessary. This is an appeal from
the judgment imposing the death penalty and from an order
denying defendant's motion for new trial or for modification
of the judgment by reduction of the offense to second degree
murder.
Defendant contends: There is no evidence that Welch was
killed in San Diego County, California, as charged. There
is no evidence of the circumstances surrounding the killing
to show that it was murder of the first degree. Evidence of
other offenses was improperly admitted over objection. HearBay evidence prejudicial to defendant was introduced over
objection. Prejudicial error was committed by the introduction in evidence of revolting and inflammatory exhibits
unnecessary to the People's case. The prosecuting attorney
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in his opening statement
and argument. We have concluded that the record discloses
no error which, in the circumstances of this case, is ground
for reversal.
In April, 1953, defendant was committed to Patton State
Hospital, an institution for the mentally ill, at his own
request. Defendant gave a history of asserted "blackouts"
during which, without knowing what he was doing, he would
leave his home and write and pass bad checks. The psychiatrist who examined defendant in connection with the commitment to Patton found no evidence of any psychosis or physical
condition which would cause amnesia and did not believe that
defendant" blacked out, " but made the diagnosis" psychotic"
because of defendant's desire for treatment at a state institution. On July 12 defendant left the hospital without a
discharge and went to Chula Vista, San Diego County, where
he had lived. Between July 12 and July 23 he cashed a
number of bad checks.
Welch had been honorably discharged from the Marine
Corps on May 28, 1953, in Tucson, Arizona. He and his wife
were living in Chula Vista on July 23, 1953, the alleged date
of the homicide.
On the afternoon of July 23 defendant was drinking beer
'The jury had been instructed that such a finding and omission of
neommendation as to penaltl would result in imposition of the death
Mteaoe
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at Thompson's Cafe in Chula Vista, about six miles from
the Mexican border. At about 5 :30 p. m. he called a cab
and went to various stores where he made purchases, including a watch, and cashed or attempted to cash bad checks;
he falsely represented that he was a doctor and a commander
in the United States Navy. Defendant returned to the cafe
at about 6 :30 p. m. Meanwhile Welch had entered the cafe.
He and defendant then met for the first time. They talked
and drank beer together. rfhe waitress heard Welch tell
defendant that his head was bothering him and defendant
say that he was a doctor in the Navy and "I will fix your
head. " At about 10 p. m. Welch said that he would like
to go home; he had indicated where he lived; defendant said
that he would go with him because he too lived "out that
way. ' , They left the cafe together. Welch was not seen
alive again by any witness (other than defendant) who
testified.
The only direct evidence as to what occurred to and between defendant and Welch during the next hour and a half
consists of conflicting extrajudicial admissions and testimony
of defendant, and a "confession" of defendant that he killed
Welch in Tijuana, Mexico. The People take the position
that defendant killed Welch but not in Tijuana; defendant
takes the position that Welch was killed in Tijuana but not
by him. According to defendant '8 testimony, he and Welch
went to Tijuana in Welch's 1951 Ford convertible; in Tijuana
Welch said that he wished some food; defendant went into
a cantina, leaving Welch in the back seat of the car; when
defendant returned after about 20 minutes Welch was naked
and had been killed by blows on the head and stab wounds
in the chest; defendant, apprehensive of the Mexican authorities, put the body in the trunk of the car and returned to
Chula Vista.
According to defendant's "confession," as distinguished
from his testimony above related, he and Welch picked up
two girls in Tijuana; when defendant returned to the car
after purchasing the food Welch was sexually mistreating
the girl whom defendant was with; defendant became enraged
and beat Welch and stabbed him with a souvenir knife which
defendant had purchased; the girls vanished; defendant put
the body in the trunk, threw a way the knife and Welch'8
clothes, and returned to Cliula Vista.
Defendant was next seen (by witnesses who testified at the
trial) at about 11 :30 or 11 :45 p. m.. of t1u same dq. He
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came into the Club 13, near Chula Vista, had a beer, repaid
a waitress $20 which defendant's ~if~ had borrowed, and
gave the waitress $25 which he asked her to give his wife.
lIe then decided to see his wife, drove Welch's car to her
home, and they returned to the Club 13 and drank beer.
They left the Club 13 a little before 1 a. m. Defendant
drove his wife home. He told her nothing of Welch; he
said that he would return to Patton State .Hospital and left.
To show defendant's whereabouts after he left his wife
and before he was apprehended the prosecution introduced
evidence which disclosed that during this period defendant
had committed various crimes.
Defendant was in Kingman, Arizona, on July 25, 1953.
Representing himself to be Ralph Welch, he pawned the
watch he had bought on the 23d and received $10.
On Sunday, July 26, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, defendant
induced a priest to lend him $20 by representations that
defendant was a student on his way to the University of
Denver and had run out of funds.
At about 6 p. m. on July 27, 1953, defendant sent
two collect wires from the \Vestern Union office in Colorado
Springs, Colorado. One was to Vol elch 's parents in Tucson,
Arizona, and one to his wife in Chula Vista. Each was signed
"Ralph R. Welch" and asked for $75. \Velch's wife wired
the money as requested and defendant received it at the
Colorado Springs Western Union office on July 28 after
presenting Welch's identification. He asked the clerk to
forward the other money order to Denver. She did so and
defendant received and cashed it there.
On the evening of July 29, 1953, defendant and a man
named Jack Jones went into a bar just outside the city
limits of Denver. Defendant seemed nervous and belligerent.
He attracted considerable attention by announcing that he
would burn a dollar bill and doing so. Defendant and Jones
left the bar shortly after 7 p. m.
At about 9 :15 p. m. on July 29 Denver police officers
patrolling in a radio car went to St. Luke's Hospital pursuant to a radio call. Defendant had brought Jones to the
hospital; Jones had severe head lacerations and a badly mangled left hand; all his pockets were turned out. Defendant
told the officers that he was Ralph Welch of Tucson, Arizona,
and that while driving through Denver on his way to Columbia University he saw an injured man lying on the street,
put him in his car, an~ obtained directioll8 to the hospital
M~
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from a small boy. After some conversation the officers in.
formed defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant
agreed to go with the officers to the Detective Bureau. As
they passed Welch's Ford defendant said that it was his.
The officers said that they would look at defendant's car.
Defendant said, "You're not going to check my car" and
ran down the street. The officers ran after him and shouted
for him to stop. When defendant continued to run they
fired several shots. One bullet hit defendant in the left
buttock and he fell. Defendant was abusive and hostile; the
two officers had to hold him. Other police and an ambulance arrived and defendant was taken to a hospital.
On the baclt seat and bacl< floor and in the trunk of the
Ford was putrefying blood. On a jack found in the car
was putrefying blood and also fresh blood. A tooth, part
of a dental bridge, hair, and sun glasses, all subsequently
identified as Welch's, were found in the car. In defendant's
pockets were $178, a table knife, a bank book of Jack Jones,
Welch's wallet with his certificate of discharge from the
Marine Corps and his Arizona driver's license, and blank
checks from the Chula Vista branch of the Bank of America.
The Denver police ascertained that Welch was missing from
Chula Vista. They questioned defendant repeatedly. On
July 30, 1953, defendant said that he was Michael Timothy
Cavanaugh of National City, California, that he had never
heard of Welch, and that he had no recollection of what had
happened to him on the night of July 29. On July 31 defendant denied that he had known Jones or Welch or had
anything to do with Welch's car. On August 3, taken to
look at Welch's car, defendant said that it smelled as if it
had contained a body but that he could not recall having .
seen the car before. On the 4th and 5th defendant continued
to deny that he had ever seen Welch. On August 6 an officer
told defendant that the authorities believed defendant had
killed Welch and that they were anxious to locate his body,
and asked defendant whether he would submit to questioning
under the influence of "truth serum." Defendant agreed
to such a test and it was performed on the afternoon of
August 7.
Sodium amytal was administered intravenously and defendant was questioned by a psychiatrist in the presence of police
officers. A transcript of what defendant said was made but
not offered in evidence. Defendant testified that he recalls
beiDa at Uwt hospital au~ receivin" an injectioD. at the be-

)
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ginning of the test, that he then Jost consciousness and has
no knowledge of what took place until he regained consciousness in the county jail the next morning.
After the questioning of defendant during the sodium
amy tal test ended on Angust 7, 1953, an offieer drove defendant to the jail. During their drive defendant gave an account of Welch's death on July 23 like that in his testimony,
supra, page 282. Defendant said that he intended to take the
body from Tijuana to the Chula Vista police; after he crossed
the border he thought he should get the advice of his wife
but when he met her he did not mention Welch; he then
decided to take the body to Welch's parents in Tucson; instead
he drove through Kingman and into New Mexico; he planned
to turn the body over to the police in Albuquerque but became frightened; by this time the body smelled so bad that
he felt he had to get rid of it; he drove off the road into the
desert, left the body covered with defendant's coat, and said
a prayer or two; he then went on through Santa Fe, borro,\ing money from the priest, and Colorado Springs, wiring
Welch's parents and wife for money, and to Denver, as hereinbefore described; while he was drinking at a Denver night
club on the evening of July 29 he met Jack Jones; defendant
and Jones went to various night clubs, drinking heavily;
they met two "fast" girls; Jones took one of the girls to
the car to "have a party"; after about 30 minutes defendant
went to the car and found Jones with his head beaten;
defendant became frightened; he asked a small boy directions
to a hospital; at St. Luke.'s defendant did not want to be involved with the police because of his possession of Welch's
car, tried to flee, and was shot and apprehended.
From defendant's account of where he left Welch's body
the Denver police gave the Albuquerque authorities information which enabled them to find the body. It was so decomposed and eaten by vermin that the physician and pathologist
who performed the autopsy could not determine the cause of
death. The greater portion of the flesh and inner organs had
been eaten away and the organs could not be identified.
There were large holes in the chest wall; their primary cause
could not be determined. The upper jaw was fractured in
seven or eight places. Insofar as autopsic conclusions are
concerned, death could have been from natural causes, from
multiple stab wounds, or from a severe beating about the
head and face. Enough skin remained on three fingers to
enable .the taking of fingerprints; comparison of theae with .

260

PEOPLE V. CAVANAUGH

[44 C.2d

W dch 's Marine records established identity of the body.
There is no contention that the evidence as a whole fails t6
establish that Welch came to his death by criminal means;
defendant's own testimony is to this effect.
On August 8, 1953. defendant, again questioned by the
Denver police, said he remembered nothing of what occurred
the day before. Defendant was returned to California in
August but was not charged with the murder of Welch until
February 25, 1954. On October 21, 1953. sodium amytal was
again administered intravellousJy and a psychiatrist questioned defendant concerning the death of Welch. The reo
suits of this questionillg were not offered in evidence. The
psyelliatrist testified that in his opinion defendant during
the questioning was controlling his answers and shamming.
On November 16. 1953, defendant was being tried before
Judge Dean Sherry of the San Diego Superior Court for
issuing checks without sufficient funds. Defendant's attorney
stated in open court that defendant wished to make a statement to Judge Sherry in the presence of the district attorney
and outside the presence of the jury. The ensuing proceedings in chambers were reported by a stenographer. Defendant
was not coerced and no promises were made to him. He said,
"It is my opinion I am in this court at this time for something I actually don't know, and I can't quite understand
•.. being punished for something I do not know. I would
much rather be punished for something that I do know . . .
I make the statement of my own free will and stand set to
accept any consequences that may follow. Here, I have a slip
of paper and my own signature .•. " Defendant then read
from the paper, "I, Michael T. Cavanaugh, do admit by this
self-written document that on July 23, 1953, at Tijuana,
Mexico, I, Michael T. Cavanaugh, did kill one Ralph Welch
as an aftermath of an argument resulting from a drunken
orgy. Signed: Michael '1'. Cavanaugh."
Defelldant proceeded to make the "confession" summarized supra, page 282. Defendant said that he was so enraged
by Welch's asserted mistreatment of the girl that he cut off
dch 's penis. (Actually, thIs had not been done to Welch's
body.) After defendant completed his" confession," he said
insistently that his claimed" blackouts" while writing checks
were real; "I have no know ledge of writing the checks that
you have charged me with .•. I just can't seem to be found
guilty of somethin~ I don't know. and I would much rather
have them shoot me for something I do know." Asked.,

'V
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" [1] n respect to the Welch affair .•• , do you contend that
you were under any blackout conditions Y" defendant replied,
"No, sir. I did not state that. . .. I am not making any contention ••• that at the time I was in a blackout . . . 1 just
simply blew my top."
The Mexican correspondent for a San Diego paper, who
acted as interpreter at interviews between defendant and the
chief investigator for the Tijuana police force, in November,
1953, testified for the People that defendant made various
statements as to where he had killed 'Velch and where he
_had disposed of Welch's clothes and the knife; the Mexican
authorities checked each of defendant's stories, attempted unsuccessfully to find the girls whom defendant said he and
Welch had picked up and to find anyone who had seen defendant in Tijuana, and found no evidence that a killing had
been committed in Tijuana on JUly 23, 1953.
Patrick 0 'Riley (who had testified for the People at the
preliminary hearing and who was subpoenaed by both the
People and defendant) testified for defendant at the trial as
follows: He met defendant in the San Diego jail in November,
1953, and for two months they were cell mates. They corroborated in preparation of the "confession" which defendant made to Judge Sherry because they thought that defendant might receive a light sentence if he were tried for a
homicide in Mexico. When flaws in the story were revealed
by investigation of the Mexican authorities they changed the
story in attempts to cover Up the discrepancies. 0 'Riley was
playing diverse roles while he was in jail with defendant:
he was dealing with defendant in what defendant believed
was a good faith attempt to enable defendant to obtain
lighter punishment; he was passing out information to confuse the Mexican authorities; and he was working with the
California authorities to get a confession from defendant.
Defendant at no time told 0 'Riley that he had actually
killed Welch or that he knew that Welch was killed in California.
As previously stated, defendant's testimony at the trial
was that he and Welch went to Tijuana, that he left the
car for a short time and found Welch's body when he returned. Defendant repeatedly stated on the stand that he
would only testify as to the killing of Welch; he said that
he would not answer questions as to past prosecutions or as
to where he got the money which he had at Thompson's Cafe
()D the aftexooon of July 23; asked why he wired Welch's
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parents and wife for money, he replied that he would only
answer as to the killing of Welch in Mexico.
A witness testified for defendant that as an experiment
he had made a trip to Tijuana similar to the one described
in defendant's testimony, starting from Thompson's Cafe
at 10 p. m., stopping as indicated by defendant in his testimony, returning across the border, and reaching the Club
13 at 11 :26 p. m.
Defendant, as previously stated, urges that there is no evidence that Welch was killed in California. Section 27 of
the Penal Code provides in material part that" The following
persons are liable to punishment under the laws of this state:
1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime
within this state . . . " Section 790 provides in material part,
"The jurisdiction of a criminal action for murder or manslaughter is in the county where the fatal injury was inflicted or in the county in which the party injured died or in
th? I.'ouuty ill whi"h hi.s b0d~' was found •.. "
At the dose of the P~)pll"s e\·iJ.ell~~ 011 th~ issue of guilt
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that there was
no evidence of jurisdiction, and after defendant rested he
moved for an advised verdict on the ground of lack of proof
of venue or jurisdiction. These motions were denied.
The jury were instructed that "in order to convict the
defendant you must find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the fatal injury was inflicted upon Ralph Welch by the
defendant in San Diego County,or that Ralph Welch died in
San Diego County as a result of the injuries inflicted by the
defendant. • • . Guilt, as I have repeatedly said to you, must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. . .. As to the place of
the commission of the crime, the law merely requires that it
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence . • ."
[1] The instruction to the effect that territorial jurisdiction could be established by a preponderance of the evidence was correct. (People v. Megladdery (1940), 40 Cal.
App.2d 748, 766 [106 P.2d 84] ; People v. Guernsey (1947),
80 Cal.App.2d 463, 4G6 [180 P.2d 27].) [2] And such jurisdiction, like any other fact, can be shown by circumstantial
evidence. (People v. Hill (1934),2 Cal.App.2d 141, 151 [37
P.2d 849] ; People v. Harkness (1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 133,
139 [124 P.2d 85].)
[3] Here the jury could infer that the killing occurred
in California from the following circumstances: Defendant
and Welch left Thompson's Cafe at 10 p. m. and defendant
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arrived at the Club 13 in Welch's car at 11 :30 or 11 :45.
According to a witness for defendant who made an experimental trip to and from Tijuana similar to that described
in defendant's testimony, such trip took one hour and 26
minutes. According to defendant's testimony he was able
to move Welch's bleeding body from the back seat of thf~
car into the trunk without getting blood on his clothes, an.1
he wiped the blood from the car with a rag. According tc,
defendant, he was frightened when he brought the bl)<ly
across the border; he testified, "[I] held my breath while
the man asked me where I was born and had I bought anything and he shined his light in the front seat and in the
back and just passed me through." There is' no evidence that
defendant attracted attention during the check of cars which
pass the border.2 Defendant's wife saw no blood in the back
seat when she looked there shortly after defendant's return,
and defendant himself was not blood-stained or disheveled.
It is a reasonable conclusion that he would not have had time
to mak~ the trip to Tijuana as he testified and still to ha,e
moved the body, naked and bleeding as he claims, from the
back seat to the trunk without leaving traces of blood which
would have been observed by border guards, and that therefore he and Welch did not leave this state or San Diego
County. The evidence that defendant believed he would receive a lighter punishment if he were tried in Mexico lessens
the credibility of his statements which place the crime in that
eountry.
[4] Defendant asserts that the prosecuting attorney in
argument admitted that the People had not proved venue. He
refers to counsel's statement that "Mr. Adams [attorney for
defendant] says that we haven't told you exactly where it
[the location of the killing] is, and I think the Judge is going
to instruct you in that regard. I don't know where it is. It
IS going to be locked in this man's heart, probably forever."
This was not an admission of a failure of proof. The statement was properly made in the course of argument that the
place of killing could be inferred.
'A United States immigration inspector who was on duty at the place
where defendant testified he crossed the border on the night of July 23,
1953, described the procedure of checking persons who come into the
United States in automobiles. Entrants are questioned and at night the
inside of their cars is examined by flashlight; if they appear intoxicated
they are stopped; if they are nervous or the questioning officer's suspicions of illegal entry or customs violation are otherwise aroused they are
detained for more thorough interrogation and search.

...
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Much of the evidence of defendant's activity both before
and after the killing of Welch tends to show the commission
of crimes other than the one for which he was on trial.
Defendant argues that the evidence of other crimes was not
relevant to the crime charged and served no purpose except
the improper one of prejudicing defendant. [5] Both defendant and the People recognize the correctness of the statements of law as to evidence of other crimes quoted in People
v. Newson (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 34, 47 [230 P.2d 618], from
People v. Dabb (1948),32 Ca1.2d 491,499,500 [197 P.2d 1]:
"A defendant in a criminal action cannot be required to
defend himself against the charge of any crime other than
that for which he is on trial, but this rule does not exclude
evidence which incidentally discloses the commission of another
offense. Evidence which is relevant in establishing guilt of
the crime charged is admissible notwithiitanding the fact that
it tends to connect the accused with an offense not included
in the charge. [Citations.] . .• [6] The relevancy of evidence that proves crimes other than that charged must, of
course, be examined with care, due to the prejudicial nature of
all such evidence, and it should not be admitted simply on the
showing that some part of that transaction is relevant to
the case. The possibility of severing relevant from irrelevant
portions should, in every case, be considered, thereby protecting the defendant against reference to other crimes where
it has no tendency to establish facts pertinent to the proof
of the crime charged."
(To the same effect see People v.
Peete (1946),28 Ca1.2d 306, 314-315 [169 P.2d 924]; see also
Fricke, California Criminal Evidence, 2d ed. (1950), p. 223.)
Defendant urges that the p0r50ns who observed his activities
in Chula Vista prior to his meeting with Welch could have
testified to his presence in the town without describing his
cashing of worthless cIleeks and Ilis falsely impersonating a
naval officer, and that his flight after the ldlling could have
been shown by witnesses testifying simply that they saw him
in Kingman, Albuquerque, Colorado Springs, and outside
Denver, without describing the crimes he committed there
(pawning the stolen watch, criminally obtaining money from
the priest and from \Velch's relatives, and mutilating United
States currency).
The People urge that the evidence that defendant escaped
from a state mental hospital (not a crime; see 18 Cal.Jur.2d,
pp. 251-252) and passrd b~d cheeks prior to the homicide
was i,'clevant to show a motive for the homicide; i.e., that he
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desired to escape from the neighborhood where he had done
these improper things and that therefore he killed Welch to
obtain his automobile and identification papers. And the
People argue that the evidence that after the homicide defendant pawned the watch which he had obtained by writing
a forged check and defrauded a priest tends to show defendant's need for money and thus tends to show that thereafter,
still needing money, he attacked Jones in order to rob him;
and the crimes against Jones in turn tend to show that defendant killed Welch for the purpose of taking his property.
[7] We do not believe that, according to logic and experience, the evidence of defendant's escape from the hospital
and of his nonviolent crimes sufficiently tends to show a motive
for or has enough relevance toward proving the violent rob. beries and the killing of Welch to have been properly admitted. (Sec People v. Glass (1910), 158 Cal. 650, 654-659
[112 P. 281].) However, we have concluded that in the cirCUlllstances the admission of such evidence did not prejudice
defendant or result in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 4112.) Consideration of the comparatively minor
offenses against property could hardly have influenced the
jury one way or the other in their appraisal of the evidence
as to the crime against life.
[8] The evidence tending to show the more serious offenses
of battery and robbery of Jones was relevant because of the
striking similarity in significant respects between defendant's
conduct in that case and in the case of Welch, tending to
indicate in each case a purpose of defendant to acquire the
property of a casual drinking acquaintance by force. (See
People v. Peete (1946), supra, 28 CaJ.2d 306, 318.) In each
case there is evidence tending to show that defendant viciously
attacked and robbed a victim with whom he had become
acquainted when they drank together in a bar; in e.ach case
defendant· told a rather implausible story of his drinking
companion being in the car for a short time with a girl or
girls whom he and dcfendant had "picked up" and of defendant returning to the .car to find the victim bloody and
beaten; and in each instance defendant was thereafter in
possession of property of the victim. [9] In this connection
it should be observed that while it is often said that evidence
of similar crimes is relevant to show plan, scheme, system, or
design, this is not to be understood as meaning that such
evidence is admissible only if it tends to show premeditated,
ealculated design; it also is relevant and may be admissible

)
..

'

.....

'

)

266

PEOPLE 11. CAVANAUGH

[44 C.2d

where, as here, it tends to show that defendant was guilty
of the crime charged by showing a peculiar or characteristic
behavior pattern of defendant which is ma~ifest in the conduct
of the transgressor in both crimes. (See People v. Burns
(1952), 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 535-538 [241 P .2d 308, 242
P.2d 91.)
[10] Defendant argues that this is a case where the evidence of the circumstances leading to the homicide is so
uncertain that at the most it can be said only that defendant
killed deceased and that therefore the finding that the killing
was murder of the first degree should not be upheld (citing
People v. Howard (1930), 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71
A.L.R. 1385]; People v. Moreno (1936), 6 Ca1.2d 480, 481
[58 P.2d 629]). Contrary to defendant's argument, the
evidence which has already been related is sufficient to show
that the jury could find that defendant murdered Welch in
the perpetration of robbery, as shown by his subsequent possession of Welch's property and his posing as Welch (see
People v. Watts (1926), 198 Cal. 776, 788 [247 P. 884]),
and that therefore the murder was of the first degree. (Pen.
Code, § 189; see also People v. 7'homas (1945), 25 Cal.2d
880, 895, 899 [156 P.2d 7]; People v. Bender (1945), 27
Ca1.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.
2d 121, 135-136 [169 P.2d 1, 167 A.L.R. 675]; People v.
Honeycutt (1946), 29 Ca1.2d 52, 59 [172 P.2d 698] ; People
v. Peterson (1946), 29 Ca1.2d 69, 71 [173 P.2d 11].)
[11] Defendant's argument that he was prejudiced by
the use of hearsay testimony involves the peculiar contention
that defendant's own extrajudicial statements are inadmissible hearsay. Although such statements are evidence which
tends to prove the truth of the matter stated, they constitute
admissions and are not vulnerable to the hearsay objection;
[12] also, evidence of defendant's self-contradictions was admissible to impeach him as a witness. (Bonebrake v. McCormick
(1950), 35 Ca1.2d 16, 19 [215 P.2d 728] ; People v. Southack
(1952), 39 Ca1.2d 578, 585 [248 P .2d 12] ; see also 4 Wigmore,
Evidence, 3d ed. (1940), § 1048.)
Defendant argues that the prosecution improperly used
evidence, unnecessary to the proof of the case against defendant because cumulative, which was calculated, and could
tend, to inflame the passions of the jury. The pathologist
who performed the autopsy cut off the three fingers which
formed the basi~ of fingerprint identification of Welch and
they were introduced in evidence. There is teatimony that
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the body when found was in a revolting condition, badly
decomposed, much eaten by vermin, and crawling with maggots. Photographs of the body were introduced in evidence.
'l'here was much testimony as to the smell of putrefying blood
which was about Welch's car and articles found therein. Such
articles (gravel, a blood-stained leather sleeve, a jack, a bloodstained seat cover, a tooth, the car itself) were introduced
in evidence.
[13] Generally, "except in rare cases of abuse, demonstrative evidence that tends to prove a material issue or
clarify the circumstances of the crime is admissible despitf'
its prejudicial tendency." (People v. Adamson (1946).27
Cal.2d 478, 486 [165 P.2d 3].) This rule is another
application of tht' principle, applied in the case of evidence
of other crimes, that relevant evidence is not necessarily inadmissible because of its tendency to prejudice the jury. The
admission of gruesome and horrifying photographs and objects, over objection, has been repeatedly upheld by this court
under the circumstances of the particular case (People v.
Gomez (1930), 209 Cal. 296. 300 [286 P. 998]; People v.
Harris (1934), 219 Cal. 727, 730-731 [28 P.2d 906]; People
v. Shaver (1936), 7 Ca1.2d 586, 592 [61 P.2d 1170] ; People v.
Goodwin (1937). 9 Ca1.2d 711. 714 r72 P.2d 551]: People
v. Lisenba (1939), 14 Ca1.2d 403, 411-412 [94 P.2d
569]; People v. Smith (1940), 15 Ca1.2d 640, 649 [104
P.2d 510]; People v. Dunn (1947), 29 Ca1.2d 654, 659-660
[177 P.2d 553]; People v. Isby (1947), 30 Ca1.2d 879, 892
(186 P.2d 405] ; People v. Guldbrandsen (1950), 35 Ca1.2d
514, 521-522 [218 P.2d 977]; People v. Osborn (1951), 37
Cal.2d 380, 383 [231 P.2d 850]; People v. Reed (1952),
38 Ca1.2d 423, 432 [240 P .2d 590]), although it has occasionally said, of shocking evidence which was relevant but unnecessary to establish the People's case, that" the prosecution
is not to be commended for offering it in evidence" (People
v. Burkhart (1931), 211 Cal. 726, 732 [297 P. 11] ; People v.
Sisson (1934), 1 Ca1.2d 510, 511 [36 P.2d 116]; People v.
Madison (1935),3 Ca1.2d 668, 679 [46 P.2d 159] [" Although
we cannot give sanction to the practice of exhibiting unnecessarily to the jury gory physical evidences of the crime
which are calculated or likely to inflame the jury's deliberations, nevertheless we cannot say that the exhibition during
the trial of the bed or bedding [in which deceased was slain]
necessarily was beyond propriety or had that effect.
The questions whether the exhibit should remain and was
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needed to substantiate and illustrate the expert and other
testimony as to the shots fired and whether it would tend
to inflame the jury to the prejudice of the defendant, were
questiolls addressed in the first instance to the c1iseretion of
the trial court"]; see also People v. Logan (1953), 41
Ca1.2d 279, 285 [260 P.2d 20] [error, but not prejudicial,
to admit photographs of defendant with bleeding victim at
scene of crime, and of defendant with a baseball bat and
the purse of victim at police station; "it is not apparent how
the jury would be aided in solving the facts of the case by
pictures showing defendant in the presence of the victim .
. • • [The several relevant matters pictured together] could
have been shown without the graphic connection of defendant
and the victim which resulted from photographing them
together"] ) .
One California case has been found in which it was held
that admission of gruesome photographs of the victim of
a homicide was an abuse of discretion and because of this
and other errors the judgment of conviction was reversed.
(People v. Burns (1952), supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 541-542.)
The photographs were made after the autopsy. They were
particularly horrible, and not a representation of the condition of the victim when she died, because in connection with
the autopsy the head had been shaved and wounds and
incisions made. The court said that admission of the photographs improperly crossed the line between "a photograph
which is of some help to the jury in solving the facts of
the case and one which is of no value other than to inflame
the minds of the jurors."
[14] Here no useful and proper purpose was served by
emphasizing to the jury, by repeated testimonial and photographic description, the horrible condition in which the body
was because of its having been left on the desert. No useful
and proper purpose was served by introducing in evidence
the fingers of deceased. The purpose for which they were
received, identification, could be and was accomplished by
testimonial evidence of a fingerprint expert. Without such
testimony the fingers would have meant nothing to the jury.
With such testimony, they were unnecessary. The use of
this evidence, like the use of the irrelevant evidence of other
nonviolent erimes, in the manner and extent to which it was
done, was improper and erroneous. Nevertheless, by the
mandate of section 41j:! of article VI of the Constitution of
California, we may not reverse a judgment unless we conclude,
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after examination of the entire record, that there has been
a miscarriage of justice. Such examination of the record
here leaves us with the view that upon the evidence lawfully
adduced, and notwithstanding that improperly presented, no
miscarriage of justice is shown. In a closer case the misconduct related could well deprive the defendant of a fair
trial and require reversal of the judgment.
[15] Defendant '8 further contention that the district
attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct ill oral argument to the jury is without merit. Neither the portions of
the argument specificaI1y directed to our attention by defendant '8 counsel nor other portions thereof are improper
except in one respect. That exception is the argument that
defendant's nonviolent crimes against property tend to show
that defendant was the sort of person who would viciously
beat a person in order to rob him. This argument is not
an improper appeal to passion; rather, it is improper reasoning, and resort to it might well tend to weaken rather than
strengthen the case of the prosecution. But however it be
viewed, as previously indicated we have concluded that, in
all the circumstances of the case, the presentation of this
theory to the jury did not, by itself or cumulatively with
other errors, result in a miscarriage of justice.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment and order
appealed from are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Once again a majority of this court has permitted the
use of evidence of crimes other than the one for which the
defendant was on trial. As I said in my dissent in People v.
Westek, 31 Ca1.2d 4,-;q, 484 [190 P.2d 9], where the evidence
of other crimes was offered by way of impeachment, "While
the majority base their holding in this case, that evidence
of other crimes was admissible, upon the ground that such
evidence was offered by way of impeachment, the effect is
just the same as if it had been offered as a part of the
prosecution's case in chief [as here]. If it would have been
immaterial and irrelevant as part of the prosecution's case
in chief, it was likewise immaterial and irrelevant as impea.ching evidence." I said there that "lip service" wCi.~ ~-air1 to
the general rule but that the majority was in effect abrogating
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the rule. That has been done in the instant case where the
rule is quoted at length as it was set forth in People v. Dabb,
32 Ca1.2d 491, 499, 500 [197 P.2d 1], and then with legal
dexterity, part of the evidence so admitted is held not prejudicial and the balance thereof is imaginatively held to be
relevant "because of the striking similarity in significant
respects between defendant's conduct in that case and in the
case of Welch. • . ." There is no such similarity. The difference between the forgery of a check and murder should
be apparent to almost anyone. Many people suffer from a
need for money without resorting to murder to satisfy that
want. There is also a great difference between assault and
battery, and murder. 1'his evidence was only admitted for
its inflammatory effect and to say that it shows a "peculiar
or characteristic behavior pattern of defendant which is manifest in the conduct of the transgressor in both crimes" is
sheer sophistry. The only thing the prosecution needed to
prove was where defendant had been prior to his arrest and
that could have been done quite simply by witnesses who
said merely that they had seen him in the various locations.
There was no necessity of admitting evidence of alleged
,crimes committed by him in those locations and the only result
. to be achieved was that of prejUdicing the defendant in the
eyes of the jury-the precise thing the rule of inadmissibility
of evidence of other crimes was designed to prevent. Nothing
could be more prejudicial! I have fully set forth in other
dissents the reasons why evidence of other crimes should not
be admitted (see People v. Peete, 28 Ca1.2d 306, 322 [169
P.2d 924] ; People v. Zatzlce, 33 CaL2d 480, 486 [202 P.2d
1009] ; People v. lVestelc, 31 Ca1.2d 469, 483 [190 P.2d 9];
People v. Dabb, 32 Ca1.2d 491, 501 [197 P.2d 1] [concurring
opinion]) and it would be unnecessarily repetitious to repeat
here what I stated in those eases.
I also disagree with the holding of the majority that venue
was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The only
evidence leading to jurisdiction is the inference that time
did not permit defendant's story to be true. This inference
is based on witness' testimony that defendant left the cafe
at 10 p. m. and returned at either 11 :30 or 11 :45 p. m. and
testimony that the driving time to and from Tijuana would
be one hour and 26 minutes; that defendant could not have
moved the body in 19 minutes. It appears to me that this
inference is a far cry from the preponderance of proof of
venue required for jurisdiction.
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I also disagree with the majority holding that the admission in evidence of the dreadful and horrible objects and
photographs did not constitute prejudicial error. I agree that
it could serve no useful or proper purpose-I also agree that
its only purpose was to prejudice defendant in the interest
of securing a conviction by any means.
The majority has here condoned two highly prejudicial
errors in the instant case: That of admitting in evidence
testimony of other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant; and photographs and objects which no normal or reasonable person could view without revulsion and hatred for the
one who had, allegedly, committed an act bringing about
such a vile result. The first error could have had no other
purpose than to tell the jury what a bad person the defendant
was and had been; the other error would insure the result
desired by the prosecution-that defendant be shown no
sympathy by a horrified and inflamed jury. Under the facts
of any case, no matter what the record showed, these errors
would be prejudicial. In addition, we have the extremely
dubious showing of venue. It appears to me that if we do
not honestly recognize the prejudicial nature of such errors
and move to correct t.hem, we shall be guilty of condoning
such practices in the future and will, ultimately, deprive
those accused of crime of due process of law in its most
practical sense.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Had it been necessary for the jury to determine only
whether defendant killed decedent in the perpetration of a
robbery, I could agree that the errors committed at the trial
were not prejudicial. The jury was also presented, however,
with a very close question whether the crime was committed
in California, and it was required to determine the penalty
that should be imposed. The majority opinion concedes that
unnecessary but highly inflammatory evidence and evidence
of other crimes was erroneously admitted, and it is apparent
from the record that the prosecutor deliberately presented
his case with the purpose of inflaming the jury. I cannot
say that he did not succeed in this purpose or that a different
verdict would have been improbable had the evidence been
excluded. (People v. Bemis, 33 Ca1.2d 395. 401 f202 P.2d
82]; People v. Newson, 37 Ca1.2d 34, 46 [230 P.2d 618].)
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Accordingly, the Judgment and order appealed from should
be reversed.
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Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 11,
1955. Carter, J., and 'rrayuor, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

